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Abstract 
Intuitively, how we feel about potential outcomes will determine our decisions. Indeed, one of the most influential 
theories in psychology, Prospect Theory, implicitly assumes that feelings govern choice. Surprisingly, however, 
we know very little about the rules by which feelings are transformed into decisions. Here, we characterize a 
computational model that uses feelings to predict choice. We reveal that this model predicts choice better than 
existing value-based models, showing a unique contribution of feelings to decisions, over and above value. Similar 
to Prospect Theory value function, feelings showed diminished sensitivity to outcomes as value increased. 
However, loss aversion in choice was explained by an asymmetry in how feelings about losses and gains were 
weighed when making a decision, not by an asymmetry in the feelings themselves. The results provide new 
insights into how feelings are utilized to reach a decision. 
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Introduction 
How would you feel if you received international recognition for outstanding professional 
achievement? How would you feel if your marriage broke apart? Intuitively, answers to these 
questions are important, as they should predict your actions. If the prospect of losing your 
spouse does not fill you with negative feelings you may not attempt to keep the unit intact. 
But how exactly do feelings associated with possible outcomes relate to actual choices? What 
are the computational rules by which feelings are transformed into decisions? While an 
expanding body of literature has been dedicated to answering the reverse question, namely 
how decision outcomes affect feelings (Carter & McBride, 2013; Kassam, Morewedge, 
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; McGraw, Larsen, 
Kahneman, & Schkade, 2010; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Rutledge, Skandali, 
Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Yechiam, Telpaz, & Hochman, 2014), little is known of how feelings 
drive decisions about potential outcomes.  
Here, we examine whether feelings predict choice and built a computational model that 
characterizes this relationship. We turned to Prospect Theory (Fox & Poldrack, 2014; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992) as a starting point in this 
endeavor. Prospect Theory was not derived by eliciting people’s feelings to predict choice, 
but rather by observing people’s choices in order to estimate the subjective value associated 
with possible outcomes. An implicit assumption of the theory, however, is that subjective 
value (utility) is a proxy for feelings, which in turn govern choice; “humans described by 
Prospect Theory are guided by the immediate emotional impact of gains and losses” 
(Kahneman, 2011). This suggests that if we measure a person’s feelings associated with 
different outcomes, we should be able to generate that person’s utility function and use it to 
predict their choices. While Prospect Theory is one of the most influential theories in 
economics and psychology, this implicit assumption has never been empirically tested. Thus, 
we do not know if and how feelings guide choice. 
To address this question, in two separate studies (see Supplemental Material for replication 
study), participants reported how they felt, or expected to feel, after winning or losing 
different amounts of money. We used those self-reported feelings to form a “feeling 
function”; a function that best relates feelings (expected and/or experienced) to objective 
value.  Next, we used this function to predict participants’ choices in a different decision-
making task. Our findings were replicated in both studies. 
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An intriguing question is what such a “feeling function” would look like. One possibility is 
that it resembles Prospect Theory’s value function, which relates the subjective value 
estimated from choice data to objective value. First, for most people, the value function is 
steeper for losses in comparison to gains. This results in loss aversion, such that the absolute 
subjective value of losing a dollar is greater than that of winning a dollar. Yet, while losses 
appear to “loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), we do not know whether 
the impact of a loss on our feelings is greater than the impact of an equivalent gain. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the impact of gains and losses on feelings is similar, but that 
the weight given to those feelings differs when making a choice. Second, Prospect Theory’s 
value function is convex in the loss domain while concave in the gain domain (resembling an 
“S-shape”). The curvature of the function in both domains represents the notion of 
diminishing sensitivity to changes in value as gains and losses increase. In other words, the 
subjective value of gaining (or losing) ten dollars is smaller than twice that of gaining (or 
losing) five dollars. This diminishing sensitivity results in risk aversion in the gain domain 
and risk seeking in the loss domain, with individuals tending to choose a small sure gain over 
a high but risky gain, but a high risky loss over a small sure loss. We examined whether our 
“feeling function” was also concave for gains and convex for losses, implying that similar to 
value, feelings associated with gains and losses are less sensitive to outcome value as gains 
and losses increase. That is, the impact of winning (or losing) ten dollars on feelings is less 
than twice the impact of winning (or losing) five dollars. 
Once feelings were modeled using this “feeling function” we asked whether they can predict 
choice. Understanding how explicit feelings relate to behavior has important real-world 
implications for domains ranging from policy to industry.  
Methods 
Subjects. Fifty-nine healthy volunteers were recruited to take part in the experiment via the 
UCL Subject Pool. Sample size was determined using a power analysis (G*power version 
3.1.9.2; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Based on previous studies that have 
investigated the link between decision outcomes and self-report feelings using within-
subjects designs, effect sizes (Cohen’s dz) ranged from .245 to .798, with a mean at .401 
(Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann, 2007; Kermer et al., 2006; Yechiam et al., 
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2014). A sample size of 59 subjects was therefore required to achieve 85% power of 
detecting an effect size of .401 with an alpha of 0.05. Data collection was therefore stopped 
after 59 subjects. Three subjects were excluded: one who showed no variation at all in their 
feelings ratings, one whose data from the gambling task were lost, and one who missed more 
than 50% of the trials in the gambling task. Final analyses were run on 56 subjects (22 males, 
mean age 23.9y, age range 19-35y). With 56 subjects included, our post-hoc power to detect 
a .401 effect size was still 83.8%. All participants gave written informed consent and were 
paid for their participation. The study was approved by the departmental ethics committee at 
University College London. 
Behavioral tasks. Participants completed two tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced. 
1. Feelings Task. In the feelings task, subjects completed 4 blocks of 40 to 48 trials each, in
which they reported either expected (Fig. 1A) or experienced (Fig. 1B) feelings associated 
with a range of wins and losses (between £0.2 and £12), or no change in monetary amount 
(£0). At the beginning of each trial participants were told how much was at stake and whether 
it was a win trial (e.g., if you choose the “good” picture, you will win £10) or a loss trial (e.g., 
if you choose the “bad” picture, you will lose £10). Their task was then to make a simple 
arbitrary choice between two geometrical shapes, associated with a 50% chance of winning 
versus not winning (on win trials) or of losing versus not losing (on loss trials). On each trial 
one novel stimulus was randomly associated with a gain or loss (between £0.2 and £12) and 
the other novel stimulus with no gain and no loss (£0). Each stimulus was presented once so 
learning was not possible. There was no way for the participants to know which abstract 
stimulus was associated with a better outcome. They reported their feelings by answering the 
questions “How do you feel now?” (experienced feelings, after a choice) or “How do you 
think you will feel if you win/lose/don’t win/don’t lose?” (expected feelings, before a 
choice), using a subjective rating scale ranging from “Extremely unhappy” to “Extremely 
happy”. In 2 of the 4 blocks (counterbalanced order) they reported their expected feelings 
(Fig. 1A), and in the other 2 blocks, they reported their experienced feelings (Fig 1B). 
Expected and experienced feelings were collected in different blocks to avoid subjects simply 
remembering and repeating the same rating. The choice between the two geometrical shapes 
was simply instrumental and implemented in order to have subjects actively involved with 
the outcomes.  
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Fig. 1. Experimental design. Participants completed two tasks in a counterbalanced order 
(A,B): a feelings task where they reported (in different blocks) expected (A) or experienced 
(B) feelings associated with winning, losing, not winning or not losing a range of monetary 
amounts; and (C) a gambling task where they selected between a sure option and a gamble 
involving the same amounts as those used in the feelings task. Feelings were modeled as a 
function of value and this resulting feelings function F was used to predict choice in the 
gambling task. For each trial, feelings associated with the sure option, the risky gain, and the 
risky loss were extracted and entered in a cross-trials within-subject logistic regression 
model. 
2. Gambling Task. Participants completed a probabilistic choice task (Fig. 1C) in which they
made 288-322 choices between a risky 50/50 gamble and a sure option. Importantly, all the 
amounts used in the gambling task were the same as those used in the feelings task (between 
£0.2 and £12), such that feelings associated with these outcomes could be combined to 
predict gamble choice. There were 3 gamble types: mixed (subjects had to choose between a 
gamble with 50% chance of a gain and 50% of a loss, or sure option of £0), gain-only 
(subjects had to choose between a gamble with 50% chance of a high gain and 50% chance of 
£0, or a sure, smaller, gain) and loss-only (subjects had to choose between a gamble with 
50% chance of a high loss and 50% chance of £0, or a sure, smaller, loss). In Prospect 
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Theory, these 3 types of choices are essential to estimate loss aversion, risk preference for 
gains, and risk preference for losses, respectively. 
Subjects started the experiment with an initial endowment of £12 and were paid according to 
their choices on two randomly chosen trials (across both tasks) at the end of the experiment. 
Feelings function models. The impact of outcome on feelings was calculated relative to 
three different baselines: difference from the mid-point of the rating scale, difference from 
rating reported on the previous trial (for experienced feelings only), difference from 
corresponding zero outcome. These were calculated for each win and loss amount, for 
expected and experienced feelings separately. For each subject, for each of the above 
methods, feelings function models were then fit (ten for expected feelings and ten for 
experienced feelings) to explain how feelings best relate to value outcomes: 
Feeling Model 1: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) =  𝜷𝜷𝑥𝑥 
Feeling Model 2: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝑥𝑥,    𝑥𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑥𝑥,      𝑥𝑥 < 0 
Feeling Model 3: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆,      𝑥𝑥 > 0
−𝜷𝜷(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆,     𝑥𝑥 < 0 
Feeling Model 4: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆,      𝑥𝑥 > 0
−𝜷𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆,     𝑥𝑥 < 0 
Feeling Model 5: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈 ,      𝑥𝑥 > 0
−𝜷𝜷(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 ,     𝑥𝑥 < 0 
Feeling Model 6: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈 ,      𝑥𝑥 > 0
−𝜷𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 ,     𝑥𝑥 < 0  
Feeling Model 7: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷𝑥𝑥 +  𝜺𝜺,    𝑥𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝜷𝑥𝑥 − 𝜺𝜺,      𝑥𝑥 < 0 
Feeling Model 8: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝑥𝑥 + 𝜺𝜺,    𝑥𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑥𝑥 − 𝜺𝜺,      𝑥𝑥 < 0 
Feeling Model 9: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷𝑥𝑥 +  𝜺𝜺𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈,    𝑥𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝜷𝑥𝑥 − 𝜺𝜺𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍,      𝑥𝑥 < 0  
Feeling Model 10: 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = �𝜷𝜷𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝑥𝑥 + 𝜺𝜺𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈,    𝑥𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑥𝑥 − 𝜺𝜺𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍,      𝑥𝑥 < 0
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In all these models, 𝑥𝑥 represents the value (from -12 to -0.2 for losses and from 0.2 to 12 for 
gains) and 𝐹𝐹 the associated feeling. The slope between feelings and values is represented by 
the parameter 𝜷𝜷 estimated as a single parameter in all odd-numbered models, or separately 
for losses and gains in all even-numbered models. If loss aversion is reflected in feelings, 
𝜷𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 should be significantly greater than 𝜷𝜷𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈 and even-numbered models should perform 
better overall. Similar to the curvature parameter of Prospect Theory value function, 𝝆𝝆 
reflects the curvature of the feeling function, i.e. the fact that feelings become more or less 
sensitive to changes in value as absolute value increases (Feeling Models 3 to 6). In Feeling 
Models 5 and 6, the curvature is estimated separately in the gain and loss domains. If the 
feeling function is S-shaped (function concave for gains and convex for losses) 𝝆𝝆 values 
should be significantly smaller than 1. To ensure that a function with curvature fit the feelings 
data better than a simple linear function with an intercept, Feeling Models 7 to 10 were 
defined (as respective comparisons for Feeling Models 3 to 6), where ε represents the 
intercept, or the offset (positive for gains, negative for losses) where feelings start for values 
close to £0. All these models were estimated in Matlab (www.mathworks.com) using a 
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure (Myung, 2003). Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) were calculated for each subject and model, and then summed across subjects (see 
Supplemental Material for details). Lower sum of BICs for a given model compared to 
another indicates better model fit.   
Prediction of gambling choice. Feelings values from Feeling Model 3 (found to be the most 
parsimonious model overall) were then used to predict choices in the gambling task. 
Specifically, for each participant, the feeling associated with each amount was calculated 
using Feeling Model 3 with that participant’s estimated parameters (𝜷𝜷 and 𝝆𝝆). Thus, for each 
trial of the gambling task, a feelings value was obtained for the sure option, the gain and the 
loss presented on that trial. A feelings value of 0 was used when the amount in the gamble 
trial was £0. The probability of choosing the gamble on each trial, coded as 1 if the gamble 
was chosen and 0 if the sure option was chosen, was then entered as the dependent variable of 
a logistic regression (Choice Model), with feelings associated with the sure option (𝑆𝑆, coded 
negatively in order to obtain a positive weight), the gain (𝐺𝐺, multiplied by its probability 0.5), 
and the loss (𝐿𝐿, multiplied by its probability 0.5) entered as the 3 predictor variables: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔) = 11 + 𝑔𝑔−[𝝎𝝎𝑺𝑺𝐹𝐹(𝑆𝑆)+𝝎𝝎𝑮𝑮𝐹𝐹(𝐺𝐺)+𝝎𝝎𝑳𝑳𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)]
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Logistic regressions were run on Matlab using the glmfit function, using either expected 
feelings (Choice Model 1) or experienced feelings (Choice Model 2). To determine whether 
those modeled feelings predicted choice better than value-based models, 5 other comparisons 
models were used to predict choice from values (Choice Models 3 to 7; see Supplemental 
Material for details). 
In order to be compared across conditions and subjects, weight values 𝜔𝜔 were standardized 
using the following equation: 
𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥
′ = 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦
where 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥′  is the standardized weight value, 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥 the original weight for predictor variable 𝑥𝑥 
obtained from the regression, 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 the standard deviation of variable 𝑥𝑥, and 𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦 the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable 𝑦𝑦, here the binary choice values. Standardized weight 
values were extracted from each regression and compared using repeated-measures ANOVA 
and paired t-tests. 
Replication and extension study. A separate study was conducted to replicate the findings 
and extend them to cases where the impact of a loss and a gain on feelings is evaluated within 
the same trial. See Supplemental Material for details and results. 
Results 
Our analysis followed two main steps. First we used participants’ reported feelings associated 
with different monetary outcomes to build a “feeling function”. Specifically, we found the 
best fitting computational model to characterize how feelings associated with different 
amounts of gains and losses relate to the objective value of these amounts. Second, we tested 
whether that model of feelings predicted participants’ choices on a separate task. Results of 
the main study are reported below and results of the replication study in the Supplemental 
Material. 
Characterizing a “feeling function” 
Feelings associated with losses and gains were elicited using one of two different scales and 
the impact of losses and gains on feelings were computed using three different methods (see 
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Supplemental Material for details): as the change from the mid-point of the rating scale, as 
the change from the previous rating, and as the change from the rating associated with zero 
outcome (i.e., the rating associated with not winning or not losing the equivalent amount). 
For all the models described below the latter baseline resulted in the best fit (Table S1). Thus 
we report results using this baseline.  
We aimed to characterize a model that best fit feelings to outcome value. To that end, for 
each subject ten models (see Methods for equations) were run to fit data of expected feelings 
to outcome value and ten equivalent models to fit experienced feelings to outcome value. The 
models differed from each other in two ways. First, in some models the slope of the function, 
which indicates how much feelings change for each unit gained/lost, was represented by one 
parameter (𝛽𝛽) and in others by two parameters; one for gains (𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔) and one for losses 
(𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙). If the latter set of models fit better, that would indicate that gains and losses affect 
feelings to different extents; if the former set does better that would indicate no difference in 
the magnitude of influence. Second, models differed with respects to the curvature of the 
function (𝜌𝜌). Some models allowed for ρ, some allowed for different curvatures in the loss 
(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) and gain (𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔) domains, while others did not allow for a curvature at all but rather 
were linear models with either one intercept (𝜀𝜀) or two intercepts (𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, 𝜀𝜀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙). If models with 
a curvature (𝜌𝜌) fit better than linear models with an intercept (𝜀𝜀) that would suggest that 
feelings do not increase linearly as a function of outcome value, but that their sensitivity 
varies as outcomes increase, such that the feeling of winning/losing £10 is more or less 
intense than twice the feeling of winning/losing £5. Models were estimated using a 
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure (see Methods for details). Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC), which penalises for additional parameters, showed that the best fitting model 
(i.e. the lowest BIC value) for both expected (Fig. 2A) and experienced (Fig. 2B) feelings 
was Feeling Model 3 (see Table S2 for BIC and R2 values), which has one ρ and one β:  
𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = � 𝜷𝜷(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆, 𝑥𝑥 > 0
−𝜷𝜷(|𝑥𝑥|)𝝆𝝆, 𝑥𝑥 < 0 (1) 
where x is the gain/loss amount (positive for gains and negative for losses) and F the 
corresponding feeling.  
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Fig. 2. Feeling Models. BIC values, summed across all subjects, are plotted for ten models 
fitting feelings to outcome value (see Methods for equations), separately for (A) Expected 
feelings ratings and (B) Experienced feelings ratings. Feeling Model 3 was the most 
parsimonious model, as indicated by lower BIC values for both expected and experienced 
feelings. 
This suggests that: 
(i) feelings’ sensitivity to outcomes gradually decreased as outcomes increase. Similar to 
Prospect Theory’s value function, ρ was significantly smaller than 1 (expected feelings: 
ρ=.512 ± SD .26, t(55)=-14.05, P<.001, Cohen’s dz=1.88, 95% CI=[.418;.558]; experienced 
feelings: ρ=.425 ± SD .23, t(55)=-18.52, P<.001, Cohen’s dz=2.5, 95% CI=[.513;.637]), 
indicating that the feeling function was concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss 
Models of affective decision-making 
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domain. Graphically, we can observe in Fig. 3 that the magnitude of feelings associated with 
£10 for example was less than twice the magnitude of feelings associated with £5.  
(ii) neither sensitivity (β) nor curvature (ρ) differed for gains than losses. Equal sensitivity 
suggests that when feelings associated with losses and gains are evaluated separately their 
impact is symmetrical, such that losses are not experienced more intensely than gains. On the 
surface, these findings contradict the notion of “loss aversion” as proposed by Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992). However, what 
we will show later is that while losses do not necessarily impact feelings more than gains they 
are weighted to a greater extent when making a choice (see Results section on pg 16). With 
regards to curvature, a single ρ was more parsimonious than two separate ones for gains and 
losses, suggesting that the extent of concavity for gains was equivalent to the extent of 
convexity for losses. 
Further support for point (i) came from the fact that all models with a curvature parameter ρ 
(Feeling Models 3-6) were better fits, as indicated by lower BIC values, than corresponding 
linear models with an intercept (Feeling Models 7-10). This was true both when comparing 
BICs for models fitting expected feelings (BIC difference < -112) and experienced feelings 
(BIC difference < -37) (Table S2). Further support for point (ii) came from the fact that 
Feeling Model 3 had lower BICs than other curved functions with additional parameters that 
fit gains and losses with separate parameters (Feeling Models 4-6, see Table S3) for both 
expected and experienced feelings. In addition, the absolute impact of losses and gains on 
ratings of feelings relative to a zero outcome revealed no difference (F(1,55)=0.01, P=0.92, 
ηp
2=.00018). 
Impact bias increases with the amount at stake 
Interestingly, comparing the functions for experienced and expected feelings revealed an 
“impact bias” that increased with amounts lost/gained. The “impact bias” is the tendency to 
expect losses/gains to impact our feelings more than they actually do (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, 
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Specifically, the curvature (ρ) was smaller for experienced 
feeling function relative to expected feeling function (paired t-test: t(55)=3.31, P=0.002, 
Cohen’s dz=.442, 95% CI=[.034;.138]), while there was no difference in sensitivity values (β) 
(t(55)=0.65, P=0.52, Cohen’s dz=.087, 95% CI=[-.079;.155]). Thus, although both expected 
and experienced feelings became less sensitive to outcomes as absolute values of loss/gain 
increased, this diminished sensitivity was more pronounced in experience than in expectation. 
As a result, for small amounts of money gained/lost people’s expectations of how they will 
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feel were more likely to align with their experience. However, as amounts gained/lost 
increased, people were more likely to overestimate the effect of outcomes on their feelings, 
expecting to be affected more by gains and losses than they actually were (i.e., the impact 
bias (Gilbert et al., 1998)). Graphically, we can observe the growth of the impact bias in Fig. 
3 as the increase in separation between the blue line (experienced feelings) and the more 
extreme orange line (expected feelings).   
Fig. 3. “Feeling function”. Plotted are expected and experienced feelings ratings averaged 
across participants for each outcome value, as well as best fitting Feeling Model 3. Average 
beta (𝛽𝛽) across participants, which represents the slope of the function, was 0.857 ± SD 0.36 
for expected feelings and 0.819 ± SD 0.37 for experienced feelings (paired t-test revealed no 
significant difference between them: t(55)=0.65, P=0.52, Cohen’s dz=.087, 95% CI=[-
.079;.155]). Average rho (𝜌𝜌), which represents the curvature of the function, was 0.512 ± SD 
0.26 for expected feelings and 0.425 ± SD 0.23 for experienced feelings. Both 𝜌𝜌 values were 
significantly smaller than 1 (t(55)>14, P<0.001, Cohen’s dz>1.87), consistent with an S-
shaped function and indicating diminishing sensitivity of feelings to increasing outcome 
values. 𝜌𝜌 was also significantly smaller for experienced relative to expected feelings (paired 
t-test: t(55)=3.31, P=0.002, Cohen’s dz=.442, 95% CI=[.034;.138]), suggesting that the 
“impact bias” grows with increasing outcomes. Error bars represent SEM.  
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Feeling function predicts choice better than value-based models 
Once we established a function that fit feelings to outcome value, we turned to the question 
of how well those feelings predict choices, in particular how they are combined and weighted 
to make a decision.  
To answer this question we used the Feeling Model built above from the data recorded in the 
first task to predict decisions made in a separate gambling task. To do so we conducted two 
logistic regressions for each participant (one using expected feelings – Choice Model 1 – and 
one using experienced feelings – Choice Model 2), where choice on the gambling task was 
entered as the dependent variable (either 1 if the subject selected the gamble or 0 if the 
subject selected the sure option) and feelings (predicted by Feeling Model 3) associated with 
the options were entered as the independent variable. Specifically, using the participant’s β 
and ρ from Feeling Model 3 we computed the feelings associated with each available option 
multiplied by their probability. For example, if a participant was offered a mixed gamble trial 
where s/he could either choose a gamble that offered a 50% chance of gaining £10 and a 50% 
chance of losing £6 or a sure option of £0, we estimated the feelings associated with these 
three elements multiplied by their probability: the feeling associated with gaining £10 
[𝐹𝐹(£10) = 𝛽𝛽 × 10𝜌𝜌 × 0.5]; the feeling associated with losing £6 [𝐹𝐹(−£6) = 𝛽𝛽 × (−6)𝜌𝜌 ×0.5] and the feeling associated with getting £0: [𝐹𝐹(£0) = 0 × 1 = 0]. These were entered in 
the logistic regression to predict choice (Choice Model). Each logistic regression thus 
resulted in three weight parameters 𝜔𝜔, which reflected the weight assigned to feelings when 
making a choice; one for gains (𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺), one for losses (𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿) and one for sure options (𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆).  
Importantly, choice models using feelings as predictors (Choice Models 1 and 2) were 
compared to five other regression models which predicted choice using: objective values 
(Choice Model 3), log of objective values (consistent with standard economics models to 
account for the curvature of utility – Choice Model 4), as well as three models derived from 
Prospect Theory, where value was weighted for each subject with their loss aversion 
parameter (Choice Model 5), risk aversion parameter (Choice Model 6), or both (Choice 
Model 7) (see Supplemental Material for more details). To avoid circularity, loss and risk 
aversion parameters were estimated using half the choice data, and all regression models 
were tested on the other half. 
Feelings, extracted either from the expected or experienced feeling function (Choice Models 
1 and 2) predicted choice better than all value-based comparison models (Choice Models 3-
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7), as indicated by lower BIC scores (Fig. 4A). Mean R2 values were also higher for both 
models predicting choice from feelings (R2=0.31 for both Choice Models 1 and 2) than for 
comparison models (0.26<R2<0.30 for Choice Models 3-7), thus consistent with the BIC 
comparison result. Running the split-half analysis 100 times, with a different way to split the 
data on every simulation, revealed that models using feelings predicted choice better than all 
5 comparison models in 99 simulations out of 100, thus confirming the reliability of this 
finding.  
Fig. 4. Choice Models. Seven logistic regressions (or Choice Models) were run to predict 
choices on the gambling task, using either feelings derived from the “feeling function” build 
using expected (Choice Model 1) or experienced (Choice Model 2) feelings as predictors, or 
using value-based comparison models (Choice Models 3-7). (A) BIC scores summed across 
subjects (smaller BIC scores indicate a better fit) show that derived feelings (both expected 
and experienced) predict choice significantly better than all other value-based models. (B) 
The resulting standardized parameters show that the weight of feelings associated with losses 
is largest, followed by the weight of feelings associated with gains, with the weight of 
feelings associated with sure options smallest. This suggests that feelings associated with 
losses are weighted more than feelings associated with gains. Error bars represent SEM. 
Two-tailed paired t-tests: * P<0.05. 
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Feelings associated with losses are weighted more than feelings associated with gains 
when making a decision 
Are feelings about potential losses and gains given equal weights when we deliberate on a 
decision? Our feeling function indicated that the impact of a loss on our feelings was equal to 
the impact of an equivalent gain. Yet, while losses and gains may impact explicit feelings 
similarly, we find that these feelings are weighted differently when making a choice.  
Specifically, 𝜔𝜔 parameters from our choice models, which predicted choices from feelings, 
revealed a greater weight for feelings associated with losses (𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿) relative to gains (𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺) in 
predicting choice (for expected feelings: t(55)=3.04, P=.004, Cohen’s dz=.406, 95% 
CI=[.684;3.33]; for experienced feelings: t(55)=2.93, P=.005, Cohen’s dz=.392, 95% 
CI=[.599;3.19]; Fig. 4B). Models that allowed different weights for losses and gains 
performed significantly better than models that did not (Table S4).  
Follow-up analysis revealed that this was true only in mixed-gamble trials, where losses and 
gains are weighted simultaneously, but not when comparing gain-only and loss-only trials, in 
which gains and losses are evaluated at different time points (different trials). Specifically, 
we ran logistic regressions to predict choice from feelings separately for each trial type, and 
then entered weight of feelings parameters into a two (trial type: mixed/non-mixed) by two 
(outcome: loss/gain) repeated-measures ANOVA. This revealed a significant interaction 
(expected feelings: F(1,55)=6.54, P=.013, ηp2=.106; experienced feelings: F(1,55)=7.46, 
P=.008, ηp2=.119; Fig. S1), driven by a greater weight put on feelings associated with losses 
relative to gains during mixed-gamble choices (expected feelings: t(55)=3.66, P=.001, 
Cohen’s dz=.489, 95% CI=[1.67;5.71]; experienced feelings: t(55)=2.45, P=.018, Cohen’s 
dz=.327, 95% CI=[.91;9.10]) but not during loss- versus gain-only trials (expected feelings: 
t(55)=.82, P=.42, Cohen’s dz=.109, 95% CI=[-3.25;7.71]; experienced feelings: t(55)=.79, 
P=.43, Cohen’s dz=.105, 95% CI=[-2.75;6.32]). In other words, only when potential losses 
and gains are evaluated simultaneously (i.e. in the same gamble) are feelings about losses 
weighted more strongly during choice than feelings about gains. Results of our replication 
and extension study supported this claim by showing that even when gains and losses are 
evaluated in the same trial during the feelings task, their impact on feelings does not differ, 
but their weight on gamble choice does (see Supplemental Material for details). 
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To further tease apart the asymmetrical use of feelings associated with gains and losses in 
shaping choice from the use of value alone, we ran another logistic regression (Choice Model 
8, run on all trials regardless of gamble type) in which raw feelings (i.e. reported feelings 
relative to baseline rather than those derived from the feeling function) were added as 
predictors of choice in the same logistic regression as objective values themselves. This was 
done to reveal the weight assigned to feelings in making a choice over and beyond the effect 
of value per se, when the two compete. The results showed no difference in the weight 
assigned to the value of losses and gains per se (t(55)<1.2, P>.23, Cohen’s dz<.17), only to 
the weight assigned to the associated feelings (expected feelings: t(55)=3.59, P=.001, 
Cohen’s dz=.479, 95% CI=[1.29;4.55]; experienced feelings: t(55)=2.28, P=.027, Cohen’s 
dz=.307, 95% CI=[.197;2.89]). Again, this was only true for mixed gamble choices, not for 
gain-only or loss-only trials where neither feelings nor values were weighted differently 
between losses and gains (Table S5). This suggests that losses are not weighed differently 
from gains; rather feelings associated with losses are weighed differently from feelings 
associated with gains, emphasizing the importance of feelings in decision making. 
This last conclusion raises the possibility that individual differences in decision-making could 
be explained by how people weigh feelings when making a choice. Indeed, using the weights 
from the above Choice Model 8 we show that individual differences in both loss aversion and 
the propensity to choose gambles were directly correlated with the extent to which feelings 
associated with losses were over-weighted compared to gains while controlling for value 
(correlation between loss aversion and loss-gain weight difference for expected feelings: 
r(56)=0.56, P<0.001; for experienced feelings: r(56)=0.34, P=0.012; correlation between 
propensity to gamble and loss-gain weight difference for expected feelings: r(56)=-0.61, 
P<0.001; for experienced feelings: r(56)=-0.46, P<0.001; Fig. 5, see Supplementary 
Information for loss aversion modeling). Specifically, subjects who weighed feelings 
associated with losses more than gains were more loss averse and less likely to gamble.  
This set of results suggests that the asymmetric influence of gains and losses on decision-
making, as suggested by Prospect Theory, is neither reflected in expected nor experienced 
feelings, nor in different weights assigned to value per se, but rather in the extent to which 
feelings associated with losses and gains are taken into account when making a decision. 
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Fig. 5. Individual differences in choice are driven by the relative weights of feelings. 
Raw feelings (i.e. reported feelings relative to baseline) and objective values were combined 
in the same regression model (Choice Model 8) to examine the extent to which feelings 
predict choice while controlling for value. Each regression used either Expected (A,C) or 
Experienced (B,D) raw feelings together with objective values of each of the 3 decision 
options (Gain, Loss, Sure option), leading to 6 weight parameters in each regression 
(𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙, 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙, 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙, 𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓, 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓, 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓). The difference between the weight of feelings 
about losses (𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙) and the weight of feelings about gains (𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙) was then calculated for 
each individual and each regression and plotted against ln Loss Aversion (A,B) (parameter 
estimated for each individual from the choice data) and proportion of chosen gambles (C,D). 
These correlations indicate that the greater weight a participant puts on feelings associated 
with a loss relative to a gain when making a decision, the more loss averse (and less likely to 
gamble) they are. Note that loss aversion and propensity to gamble are highly correlated, 
therefore correlations in C and D are not independent from A and B, respectively, and are 
displayed for illustrations purposes.   
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Discussion 
The relationship between human feelings and the choices they make has occupied scientists, 
policymakers and philosophers for decades. Indeed, in recent years numerous studies have 
investigated how decisions and outcomes impact people’s feelings (Carter & McBride, 2013; 
Kassam et al., 2011; Kermer et al., 2006; McGraw et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997; Rutledge 
et al., 2014; Yechiam et al., 2014) and life satisfaction (Boyce, Wood, Banks, Clark, & 
Brown, 2013; De Neve et al., 2015). Yet, the equally critical question of how people’s 
explicit feelings impact their decisions has been relatively neglected. In this study, we 
addressed this important question in a controlled laboratory setting and modeled how feelings 
are integrated into decisions. We demonstrated that feelings drive the decisions people make. 
However, the rules by which they do so differ from previously assumed. 
Feelings were first modeled in a “feeling function” (Feeling Model), which was then used to 
predict choices (Choice Model). Our Feeling Model predicted choice better than objective 
values, and a unique contribution of feelings in the decision process was demonstrated. The 
“feeling function” that best related feelings to value was revealed to be concave for gains and 
convex for losses, similar to Prospect Theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and other non-linear utility functions (Bernoulli, 1954; Fox & 
Poldrack, 2014; Stauffer, Lak, & Schultz, 2014; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This 
curvature suggests that explicit feelings, similar to subjective value or utility, show 
diminishing sensitivity to outcomes as the value of these outcomes increases (Carter & 
McBride, 2013). In other words, the impact of winning or losing ten dollars on feelings is less 
than twice that of winning or losing five dollars. 
Our Feeling Model also revealed no asymmetry between gains and losses, suggesting that the 
impact of a loss on feelings is not necessarily greater than the impact of an equivalent gain. 
This was replicated in a separate study extending the symmetrical impact of gains and losses 
on feelings to cases where a gain and a loss have to be evaluated at the same time. 
Nevertheless, loss aversion was still present in choice, consistent with Prospect Theory. 
Importantly, when making a decision a greater weight was put on feelings associated with 
losses relative to gains. This finding suggests that losses may not impact feelings more 
strongly than gains as previously implied, but rather that feelings about losses are weighted 
more when making a choice than feelings about gains. Moreover, the amount by which 
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feelings associated with losses are over-weighted relative to gains in making a decision 
relates to individual differences in loss aversion and propensity to gamble.  
This finding resolves a long-standing puzzle by which loss aversion is often observed in 
choice, but not necessary in explicit feelings (Harinck et al., 2007; Kermer et al., 2006; 
McGraw et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997). We suggest that the asymmetric influence of gains 
and losses on decision making, as suggested by Prospect Theory, is not reflected in expected 
or experienced feelings directly, neither in different weights assigned to value per se, but in 
the extent to which feelings about losses and gains are taken into account when making a 
decision. Our result is consistent with the interpretation of an increased attention to losses 
(Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). When losses and gains are presented separately they are 
experienced in a symmetrical way. However, when they compete for attention, as is the case 
in the mixed gambles, people may allocate more attention to the feelings they would derive 
from the loss than from the gain, leading them to choose in a loss averse manner. Another 
possibility is that people implicitly experience losses to a greater extent than gains (Hochman 
& Yechiam, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), but this difference is not exhibited in explicit 
reports.  
Our findings also provide the first demonstration of an increasing impact bias with value. 
Specifically, we found evidence for a general impact bias in feelings (also called affective 
forecasting error), where people expect the emotional impact of an event to be greater than 
their actual experience (Gilbert et al., 1998; Kermer et al., 2006; Kwong, Wong, & Tang, 
2013; Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2013; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013; Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2013). Interestingly, this impact bias was not constant, but increased with value. This 
was due to a stronger curvature of experienced feelings relative to expected feelings. In other 
words, as absolute value increases, sensitivity to value diminished more quickly for 
experienced relative to expected feelings. This suggests that as people win or lose more 
money, they are more and more biased towards overestimating the emotional impact of these 
outcomes.  
Our modeling approach provides novel insight into how explicit feelings relate to choice. 
Such understanding is both of theoretical importance and has practical implications for 
policy-makers, economists and clinicians who often measure explicit feelings to predict 
choice (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, & Rees-Jones, 2012, 2014). 
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